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Interagency Group/Countermeasures

Washington, D.C. 20505

*TCA/IG/CM  
Minutes*

D/ICS-86-0783  
12 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members and Invitees

FROM:

Executive Secretary

25X1

SUBJECT: Draft Minutes--18th IG/CM Meeting, 4 March 1986

Attached are draft minutes of the 18th IG/CM meeting held on 4 March 1986. Please call  secure by COB 19 March 1986 with corrections/comments; otherwise the minutes will be considered final as written.

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Attachment:  
a/s

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from classified attachment.

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**SUMMARY OF IG/CM MEETING  
4 MARCH 1986**

ROOM 6W02, [REDACTED]

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1. The eighteenth meeting of the Interagency Group/Countermeasures (IG/CM) was convened at 1400 hours, 4 March 1986, by the Chairman, Mr. Craig Alderman, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). A list of individuals attending is at Attachment 1. [REDACTED]

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2. The Chairman made the following opening remarks:

a. Per intention announced at the last IG/CM meeting, on 10 February 1986 a memorandum was sent to the SIG-I Chairman recommending that the National Security Advisor sign certain categories of policy memoranda (Attachment 2). It was determined that the DCI was unavailable and Mr. McMahon, Acting Director, was considering on whether to forward the memorandum to the NSC or discuss the contents with Admiral Poindexter at the next NSC meeting. A major point which may first need resolution is whether the DCI has the authority to implement certain policy in his capacity as SIG-I Chairman. A related precedent was undertaken in establishing the National Operations Security Advisory Committee (NOAC). [REDACTED]

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b. Comments on the terms of reference for the annual national threat assessment are due. Delinquent agencies should respond quickly. [REDACTED]

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c. At the Chairman's request, Mary Lawton, DoJ, gave a status report of her working group paper on personnel security options. In summary, the NSC has commented on the DoJ-recommended options. A DoJ-prepared policy paper which deals only with collateral clearances will be sent to the NSC by 4 May. A decision to send it to Congress will be left to the NSC. A brief discussion ensued concerning SCI standards and a single scope background for SCI. Ms. Lawton noted that the DCI has responsibility for SCI standards under E.O. 12333. The Chairman agreed, and stated it was appropriate for the working group to deal only with collateral clearances. [REDACTED]

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3. The scheduled agenda items were introduced and discussed with the following results:

a. CI/CM Capabilities Report Review: [REDACTED] provided a summary of action to date. Following are the key points:

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- SSCI recommendations dealing solely with counterintelligence were received on 26 January 1986, and an interim executive branch response was provided on 6 February. The response essentially agreed with the SSCI counterintelligence recommendations with some modifications. The Chairman noted that the SIG-I had no problem with the substance of the SSCI recommendations per se, but the SIG-I membership was uncomfortable about perceived SSCI micro-management and the SSCI listing of many recommendations which the Intelligence Community is already acting upon. ☐ 25X1
- Additional SSCI recommendations dealing with security countermeasures were received on 18 February and are presently being staffed. These recommendations are more difficult to rapidly respond to than those on counterintelligence, and have a far reaching impact on the security countermeasure community. (The Chairman emphasized this point and cautioned the membership to carefully examine the SSCI security countermeasures recommendations.) ☐ 25X1
- The SSCI expects an interim CM report by 12 March and, originally, an unofficial report was to be provided. However, since the DCI is out of town until 16 March and because of the substance concerning key issues, the report will first go through the SIG-I. ☐ 25X1
- General Stilwell has negotiated an extension for submission of the final report from 4 April to 4 May to accommodate necessary staffing time resulting from SSCI delay in providing Congressional recommendations to the executive branch. ☐ 25X1

**ACTION:** The IG/CM role will require coordination on the final report to the SIG-I and action on implementing approved recommendations. ☐ 25X1

b. **"Stilwell Commission" Recommendations Review:** Ms. Lawton circulated a draft report scoping the Commission recommendations. The Chairman suggested, and the members agreed that the report should be used as a reference guide at this time. A final report will be sent to the members under separate correspondence. ☐ 25X1

**ACTION:** The Secretariat and the DoJ representative will coordinate to ensure appropriate distribution of the report. ☐ 25X1

c. **OPSEC Advisory Committee Reports:** Mr. Jack Donnelly, OSD, provided a status report on the following issues:

(1) NOAC conclusions are that because of the variety of extant counter-imagery programs, no national program per se is required. Rather, what is needed is a national counter-imagery policy statement at the NSC level which provides overall guidance and direction for the variety of programs. NOAC is developing a proposed policy statement. Counter-imagery guidelines will be incorporated into the policy statement. ☐ 25X1

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(2) DoE and NSA prepared a proposed OPSEC NSDD strawman for NOAC consideration. NOAC members were in disagreement with the proposed NSDD, and the NOAC will continue to work the problem. The Chairman noted that a major problem concerns definition of OPSEC. Mr. Donnelly noted that different agencies have their own interpretation of the definition, and NOAC will probably submit to the IG/CM two versions of a proposed OPSEC NSDD. The IG/CM would then decide which version is acceptable. ☐

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(3) Mr. John Hoover, OSD, reported on the IR&DC study recommendation that R&D might assist the OPSEC process. The IR&DC Technical Advisory Forum has held several meetings on the subject, and a clear line of communication has been established between the unit, NOAC, and the IR&DC for handling R&D projects for study. Although few topics have been proposed for consideration and none have so far been accepted, Mr. Hoover felt that all parties are aware of the proper mechanism for obtaining R&D support. Moreover, if emphasis is needed, proposed topics for R&D study can go via NOAC to the IR&DC.

ACTION: The NOAC will continue deliberations to resolve Issues 1 and 2. The IG/CM has completed action on Issue 3. ☐

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4. The Chairman set the week of 21 April for the next IG/CM meeting, with the following agenda:

a. NSA briefing on hostile intelligence services' clandestine SIGINT in the United States. ☐

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b. NSA briefing on protection of telecommunications information and equipment. ☐

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c. CIA report on improved counter-imagery analysis. ☐

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5. The meeting adjourned at 1505. ☐

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Attachment 2

Interagency Group/Countermeasures

Washington, D.C. 20505

10 FEB 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP/INTELLIGENCE  
SUBJECT: Alternative Executive Policy Statement

Since the SIG-I apparatus was established in 1982, the only form in which executive branch policy within our jurisdiction has been promulgated has been the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD), signed by the President.

As a practical matter, this has meant that certain policy issuances prepared by, and transmitted through, the SIG-I apparatus have languished at the NSC level for long periods, because they did not appear, at least initially, to rise to the level of Presidential decisionmaking (e.g., foreign ownership; security awareness; reporting hostile contacts; the civil overflight security program; and operations security). I do not quarrel with this, per se; indeed, it seems clear certain of these proposals are not sufficiently important to warrant Presidential attention or action. They do, however, require action by an authoritative executive branch official inasmuch as they affect many departments and agencies.

My predecessor, General Stilwell, attempted unsuccessfully some months ago to resolve this with Ken deGraffenreid and Bob Kimmitt, suggesting to them that the President's National Security Advisor be authorized to sign out executive branch policy issuances which required action by the White House but did not rise to the level of the President. No action was taken on this suggestion.

I continue, with support of the IG/CM, to see the need for such an alternative issuance if the SIG-I system is to provide a workable policy mechanism. Indeed, the lack of such an alternative poses a serious practical obstacle to the effectiveness of the system.

There is considerable precedent in previous administrations for the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to sign policy memoranda applicable to departments and agencies of the executive branch. Speaking for the Defense Department at least, such memoranda were treated as seriously and authoritatively as those signed by the President.

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We also continue to have doubts expressed by the Congressional intelligence committees that the SIG-I apparatus is effective. This would be, in the view of the IG/CM, one positive action which could be taken to improve our performance.

The IG/CM thus urges you to raise with Admiral Poindexter the desirability of an alternative form of policy issuance which he, rather than the President, could sign. These sorts of issuances might be limited to those which affect some, but not all, departments and agencies, or which are limited in scope and impact upon executive branch activities. An element of judgment will necessarily be involved in deciding which form may be appropriate, but I submit it will ordinarily not be difficult to determine. I have attached a draft memorandum from you to Admiral Poindexter for this purpose which I recommend that you raise with him personally.

  
Craig Alderman, Jr.  
Chairman

Attachment

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Need for an Alternative Form of Executive Policy Issuance

1. Since the SIG-I apparatus was established in 1982, the only form in which executive branch policy within our jurisdiction has been promulgated has been the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD), signed by the President.
2. As a practical matter, this has meant that certain policy issuances prepared by, and transmitted through, the SIG-I apparatus have languished at the NSC for long periods because they did not appear, at least initially, to rise to the level of Presidential decisionmaking (e.g., foreign ownership, security awareness, reporting hostile contacts, the civil overflight security program, and operations security). I do not quarrel with this per se; indeed, it seems clear certain of these proposals are not sufficiently important to warrant Presidential attention or action. They do, however, require action by an authoritative executive branch official inasmuch as they affect many departments and agencies.
3. Accordingly, I see the need for an alternative form of executive issuance to provide a workable mechanism for the promulgation of policy affecting multiple departments and agencies, albeit policy which is limited in scope and impact, and does not itself require action by the President.
4. There is, as you are aware, considerable precedent in previous administrations for the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to sign policy memoranda of this nature and, indeed, such memoranda were regarded as authoritative by executive departments and agencies. Also, the Congressional intelligence committees continue to express doubts regarding the effectiveness of the SIG-I system, pointing to the relatively few actions which have been approved by the President, most of which waited action for many months. Adapting an alternative policy issuance appears to be one action which might be taken to improve our performance, both in terms of the actions which come to consummation and in terms of the time required to staff them.
5. If you agree with this concept and it is agreeable to the President, I ask that you indicate your concurrence below and return this memorandum to me. This will serve as authority for the SIG-I to develop and forward for



your signature appropriate policy issuances which apply to multiple departments and agencies but which, in our view, are limited in scope and impact and, therefore, do not require action by the President.

William J. Casey  
Chairman, Senior Interagency Group-Intelligence

CONCUR:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

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Distribution of D/ICS-86-0783 (w/atts as shown):

- 1 - Mr. Alderman, OSD
- 5 - Mr. Snider, OSD (to be distributed to Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps)
- 1 - Mr. DuHadway, FBI
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - Mr. Corry, State
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - Mr. deGraffenreid, NSC
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - Mr. Leidenheimer, SECOM
- 1 - Ms. Lawton, DoJ
- 1 - Mr. McBrien, Treasury
- 1 - Mr. Jackson, Commerce
- 1 - Mr. Ritchie, Energy
- 1 - Mr. Krohn, FAA
- 1 - Mr. Seidman, Coast Guard
- 1 - Mr. Garfinkel, ISOO
- 1 - ICS Registry
- 1 - IG/CM subject
- 1 - IG/CM chrono

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